United States
About this report
Insights into information requests and removal requests originating from the United States.
Information Requests
Published on January 11, 2021
Information Requests
Published on January 11, 2021
01. Latest Data: Information Requests
Data can't be loaded
We're sorry - but this data seems unavailable right now.
02.
Overview
This data includes the number of , , and the corresponding for these requests originating from the United States. We also include a high-level breakdown of requests based on the U.S. state or territory they originated from (below). For more information about emergency requests and non-government requests, visit the Information Requests report.[1]
03.
Analysis
originating from the U.S. made up the highest percentage among requesting countries from around the world. With the exception of the second half of 2020, U.S. information requests have represented the largest share of total global volume in a reporting period since X’s first transparency report in 2012.[2]
20% of all global requests for account information originated from the United States during this reporting period. These requests accounted for 39% of all from around the world. X , in whole or in part, with 69% of these U.S. information requests.
User privacy
X generally requires a search warrant to disclose any , since users have the greatest privacy interest in this type of information.
However, X may disclose content in the U.S. without receiving a search warrant in rare circumstances, in accordance with applicable law. For example, if there is an emergency involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, in response to certain national security requests, or with the account-holder’s lawful consent. X also reports child sexual exploitation content to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) as required by U.S. law and in accordance with our zero tolerance policy.
CalECPA
X also furthers our commitment to user privacy with our support for and interpretation of CalECPA, a California state law which went into effect at the beginning of 2016. CalECPA sets a higher bar for California state government entities to obtain certain user data than the floor established by federal statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act. As a result, California state law enforcement and government entities must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to compel a provider like X to disclose IP addresses, which would also generally be available with a subpoena or court order under federal law.[3]
During this reporting period, X received 256 subpoenas and court orders issued by state and local government entities outside of California seeking IP addresses, compared to 256 such requests in the prior reporting period. Requesters either withdrew their request entirely or withdrew their request for IP addresses in 96 of those requests.
04.
Breakdown by Location
04.
Breakdown by Location
X receives from federal, state, and local authorities. The following table outlines the distribution of these requests, which are attributed to a particular state based on the location of the requesting office.
X received the greatest percentage of requests from New York, California, and West Virginia during this reporting period.[4]
Top Requesting Agencies
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) submitted the greatest percentage of requests during this reporting period. The FBI, DOJ, and USSS have also consistently submitted the greatest percentage of requests for the seven previous reporting periods.
Federal vs state requesters
Data can't be loaded
We're sorry - but this data seems unavailable right now.
County insights
This section highlights the top requesting counties in the ten states that have submitted the most state government information requests during this reporting period. We classify the county of the requester based on the address of the requesting office.
We include this level of detail to offer additional insight into the frequency that local authorities seek user data and to help identify any possible related trends over time.
Subpoenas
Subpoenas are the most common form of legal process issued under the Stored Communications Act. They do not generally require judicial review and usually seek basic subscriber information, such as the email address associated with an account and IP logs. However, as noted above, X may require a search warrant from state law enforcement to disclose IP addresses, in accordance with CalECPA.
Court orders
Unlike subpoenas, court orders do require judicial review, and must be issued by an appropriate judge. The law enforcement or government entity applying for an order must make a greater showing than is required for a subpoena, and may request transactional information (i.e., the non-content portion of communications such as the "from," "to," and "date" fields of DMs) with federal “2703(d) court orders” or state law equivalents. While X mostly receives “2703(d) orders,” more information about other types of court orders received is available below.
Search warrants
As proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, warrants typically require the most judicial scrutiny before they are issued. To obtain a search warrant, the government must demonstrate to an independent judge or magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that certain evidence will be found in the location identified. The government has to meet the greatest burden before the judge will issue this type of legal process, and warrants must be particularized to the specific facts of the case. A valid warrant is required for X to disclose the contents of communications (e.g., post content, DM content, Periscope broadcasts).
Other
Requests from law enforcement that do not fall in any of the above categories. Examples include emergency disclosure requests and other requests for account information without valid legal process.[5]
Certain types of court orders
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Requests
Mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) requests may authorize district courts within the United States to order X to produce account information for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations.[6]
X may receive U.S. requests for information on behalf of foreign governments based on other forms of cross-jurisdictional assistance. For example, requests may be issued pursuant to letters rogatory, or under mutual legal assistance agreements with countries that have not yet been officially brought into force through an actual treaty. Additionally, MLAT requests may be issued under multilateral treaties which the U.S. has signed and ratified, like the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance of the Organization of American States, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, or the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
- July 1 - December 31, 2021: 4% of court orders received have been explicitly identified as having been issued as a result of MLAT requests, which originated in Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Panama, and Turkey.
Pen Register / Trap & Trace Orders
Pen register/trap and trace (“PRTT”) orders authorize the government to obtain prospective metadata of communications for the account specified for up to 60 days. This means that X would be required to disclose data on an ongoing basis that did not yet exist at the time the order was signed. PRTT orders may require X to disclose IP address records and transactional information (i.e., the non-content portion of communications such as the "from," "to," and "date" fields). X is prohibited from notifying affected users about the existence of PRTT orders until otherwise authorized by the court, pursuant to the PRTT statute.[7]
- July 1 - December 31, 2021: 10% of court orders received by X were PRTT orders.
Wiretap Orders
Wiretap orders authorize the government to obtain prospective metadata and contents of communications for the specified account for up to 30 days. To date, X has not received a valid criminal wiretap order. X has received orders purporteldy requiring such real-time surveillance, but these orders were not issued in compliance with the requirements of the Wiretap Act and therefore X did not comply with the wiretap request. These orders nonetheless may meet legal requirements for other types of disclosures and are therefore reflected in our figures accordingly. Like PRTT orders, wiretap orders are issued under seal and X would therefore generally be prohibited from notifying affected users of the existence of such an order until otherwise ordered by the court.
X has a longstanding policy of notifying affected account holders of requests to disclose their account information unless prohibited or on the basis of an applicable exception as outlined in our Guidelines for Law Enforcement and legal request FAQs.
X sent notice to affected account holders prior to disclosure where there was no accompanying non-disclosure order, or other reasons not to provide notice.[8]
However, requests for account information are often accompanied by a binding non-disclosure order, which X from notifying account holders of the underlying legal request.
Some non-disclosure orders do not include an explicit date when the confidentiality obligation expires. X regularly seeks an amended order with specified duration for the non-disclosure requirement (e.g., 90 days) when we receive this type of indefinite order.
X has also filed challenges to non-disclosure orders where there were concerns about compliance with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) and/or the unlimited duration. In October 2017, the U.S. DOJ issued a guidance memorandum to federal prosecutors seeking non-disclosure orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). Most notably, the guidance states that prosecutors should generally seek non-disclosure orders limited to one year or less, and applications for such orders should reflect meaningful and individualized (i.e., non-boilerplate) justifications for the non-disclosure order.
07.
National Security Requests
U.S. National Security Letters
Data can't be loaded
We're sorry - but this data seems unavailable right now.
As in past reports, X is only able to publish very limited information about national security requests, due to legal prohibitions that we continue to challenge in court (see below for an update on X v. Garland, our ongoing transparency litigation).
At this time we are able to share information about the number of National Security Letters (“NSLs”) received which are no longer subject to non-disclosure orders (“NDOs”). NDOs on NSLs are lifted in one of two different ways, or .
Three gag orders were lifted during this reporting period. As reflected in the table above, non-disclosure orders for 26 total NSLs have been lifted to date.[9] We believe it is much more meaningful to publish these actual numbers than reporting in the bands authorized per the USA Freedom Act. (These reporting limits are not applicable for national security process, which are no longer subject to non-disclosure requirements, such as these NSLs.)
X is committed to continuing to use the legal mechanism available to us to request judicial review of these gag orders. More broadly, we are also committed to arguing that indefinite non-disclosure orders are unconstitutional in both the criminal and national security contexts. We view each request for judicial review as an opportunity to strengthen the legal precedent protecting our First Amendment rights.
X v. Garland
As in past reports, X is not reporting on any other national security process we may have received because of limitations imposed on us by the U.S. government. We continue to litigate this issue in our case X v. Garland. On April 17, 2020 the Court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed X’s lawsuit. X filed a notice of appeal of that decision on June 15, 2020 and an opening brief on September 24, 2020. X’s appeal was supported by an amicus brief filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The government’s responsive brief was filed on March 1, 2021. Oral argument was held on August 10, 2021 and the parties await a decision.
We will continue to fight for meaningful transparency through this and other efforts, and look forward to sharing more updates here as they become available.
01. Latest Data: Removal Requests
Data can't be loaded
We're sorry - but this data seems unavailable right now.
02.
Overview
This data includes the number of United States government (and other complaints of illegal content from authorized reporters) received to remove or withhold content, the number of in these requests, and the (either withheld or removed for violating the Our Rules). For more detailed information, read the Removal Requests report.
Footnotes
Some cases received during this reporting period may be in progress and may not be closed at the time of reporting.
Information Requests
Some cases received during this reporting period may be in progress and may not be closed at the time of reporting.
1. Information requests include both federal and state legal process. Requests are attributed to a particular state based on the location of the requesting office.
The data above does not include national security requests. Please refer to the “National security requests” section below for additional information on the national security letters we are now legally permitted to convey, and an update on the X v. Garland ( f.k.a. X v. Lynch, Sessions, and Barr) lawsuit and our commitment to fighting for greater transparency in national security request reporting.
2. X Corp.’s global headquarters is located in San Francisco, California, USA.
3. The FBI National Threat Operations Center is located in West Virginia.
4. As a California-based company, X generally requires state and local government entities outside of California to properly domesticate a request for IP addresses in California state court. As a result, X generally will not disclose IP addresses to state/local government entities outside of California without a subpoena or court order, and a broader set of X users benefit from the protections of CalECPA.
5. All Writs Act Orders - The All Writs Act is a U.S. law from 1789 which authorizes a court to issue an order which is “necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law”. The government invoked this apparent authority in the context of litigation with Apple. To date, X has not received an order issued pursuant to this authority.
6. Previously, we included a comprehensive list of the number of requests that were confirmed to have been made via MLAT procedures for all previous reports. We have updated our reporting layout to only include the MLAT data for the current report. To view historical data, please navigate to previous U.S. reports through the dropdown menu at the top of the page.
7. Previously, we included a running list of the percentage of PRTT orders received for all previous reports. We have updated our reporting layout to only include the PRTT order data for the current report. To view historical data, please navigate to previous U.S. reports through the dropdown menu at the top of the page.
8. X generally does not notify users if no data was disclosed in response to the request (i.e. the request was withdrawn by the requester prior to disclosure or the request was defective).
Other exceptions to X’s user notice policy include emergency disclosure requests, requests related to child sexual exploitation or terrorism, or other circumstances where notice would be counterproductive.
9. These numbers would not reflect NSLs for which X requested judicial review but a court determined there is an ongoing non-disclosure obligation at the time of this publication.
Removal Requests
Some cases received during this reporting period may be in progress and may not be closed at the time of reporting.
Each request may identify multiple items to be removed. For example, a single request may ask us to remove individual posts, an entire account, or both.
We may not comply with every request or all aspects of a request for a variety of reasons. For example, we do not comply with requests that fail to identify content on X.
‘posts withheld’ refers to posts that have been withheld at the individual post level, and does not count the total number of individual posts from the ‘Accounts withheld’ column.
